{"id":3414,"date":"2010-01-27T11:31:46","date_gmt":"2010-01-27T16:31:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/charityandsecurity.org\/?p=3414"},"modified":"2019-10-17T13:23:00","modified_gmt":"2019-10-17T17:23:00","slug":"legal_roadblocks_somalia_crisis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/charityandsecurity.org\/analysis\/legal_roadblocks_somalia_crisis\/","title":{"rendered":"Legal Roadblocks for U.S. Famine Relief to Somalia Creating Humanitarian Crisis"},"content":{"rendered":"
The unfolding crisis in Somalia illustrates a common dilemma U.S. nonprofits face when trying to conduct humanitarian operations in territory controlled by entities listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT). The humanitarian imperative to provide urgently needed food to nearly two million people in an area controlled by al-Shabaab, a listed SDGT, conflicts with the \u201cstrict liability\u201d standard against supporting terrorists that even has State Department employees fearing sanctions by the Treasury Department. Now the U.S. government’s response to the famine in Somalia is forcing it to confront the same onerous hurdles current national security laws create for nonprofits.<\/p>\n<\/div>
The Crisis in Somalia<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div><\/li> The Legal Dilemma<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div><\/li> More Barriers to Aid<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div><\/li><\/ul> The\u00a0Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees<\/a>\u00a0(UNHCR) calls Somalia \u201cone of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.\u201d Years of internal strife and widespread drought have left millions of Somalis dependent on food aid every month, and nearly 71 percent of the Somali population suffer from under-nourishment, according to\u00a0UN reports<\/a>.<\/p>\n A country without a functioning central government, Somalia has experienced 19 years of continuous internal conflict that has resulted in the\u00a0deaths of up to one million people<\/a>\u00a0and left at least\u00a01.5 million people internally displaced<\/a>. Its southern provinces are under the control of al-Shabaab, a terrorist group whose December 2009 attacks on humanitarian aid agencies and demands for payments forced the UN\u2019s World Food Programme (WFP) to suspend its food distribution program.\u00a0 Before being forced out, the WFP had planned on feeding nearly 2.8 million Somalis (nearly 40 percent of the entire population), and now\u00a0at least one million Somalis trapped in areas<\/a>controlled by al-Shabaab are at risk for starvation.<\/p>\n The United States is the largest contributor to the WFP.\u00a0According to the\u00a0United States Agency for International Development Assistance<\/a>\u00a0(USAID), between February 2007 and March 2008, \u201cover $319 million in assistance was provided by USAID through international and local nongovernmental organizations and United Nations agencies.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div> With nearly three million people at risk of starvation in Somalia, the urgent need for foreign aid is apparent.\u00a0However,\u00a0at least $50 million worth of American aid to Somalia<\/a>, through USAID and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), is being held up in part because of State Department concerns about facing prosecution from Treasury for inadvertent capture or use of humanitarian aid by al-Shabaab.\u00a0Russell Brooks<\/a>, a spokesman at the State Department, admitted, “It is true that some humanitarian funding was placed on hold, pending resolution of the OFAC (Treasury Department\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control) issue.”\u00a0 According to an\u00a0August 2009 report from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs<\/a>\u00a0(OCHA), \u201cthe delay in reaching a decision on humanitarian funding for Somalia by the US government is already impacting many agencies and their programmes, creating a planning challenge.\u201d<\/p>\n Current law prohibits most contact with a designated terrorist group, regardless of intent, making distribution of food to hungry people living in regions controlled by such groups nearly impossible. The\u00a0humanitarian exemption<\/a>\u00a0to the prohibition against providing material support to terrorists only extends to medicine and religious materials.<\/p>\n Interaction with a designated group, however, is sometimes unavoidable. During Sri Lanka\u2019s civil war, for example, the Liberation\u00a0Tigers<\/em>\u00a0of\u00a0Tamil<\/em>\u00a0Eelam (LTTE) \u201cestablished an extensive network of\u00a0checkpoints<\/a>\u201d\u00a0restricting who entered or left their territory.\u00a0After the 2004 tsunami left hundreds of thousand on the island in need, humanitarian groups found it nearly impossible to deliver aid to the refugees without some contact with the LTTE.<\/p>\n In Somalia al-Shabaab has reportedly made matters worse by requiring nonprofits to pay monthly “security” fees as part of permission to operate in areas they control.\u00a0Peter Smerdon<\/a>, a spokesman for the WFP, said recently, \u201cin November, Shabaab gave us a list of 11 conditions for aid agencies to meet, including removing women from jobs in aid work. They also made a demand for payment of $20,000 over six months for security.\u201d\u00a0 The\u00a0New York Times\u00a0<\/a>reported that \u201cUnited Nations officials say they have no choice but to work with local Shabaab commanders to distribute critically needed aid, like 110-pound bags of sorghum, tins of vegetable oil, plastic sheeting and medical supplies, in Shabaab-controlled areas.\u201d<\/p>\n The dilemma this creates in a humanitarian crisis is so severe that in the fall of 2009, according to the\u00a0New York Times<\/a>, the State Department sought \u201cconfirmation that OFAC (Treasury) will not seek enforcement action against United States government employees, grantees and contractors\u201d if, \u201caccidental, unintentional or incidental benefits\u201d goes to al-Shabab.\u00a0Treasury responded by saying any transactions with al-Shabaab \u201cwere prohibited, but that it would not prosecute American aid officials if they acted in ‘good faith.’\u201d<\/p>\n That hardly serves as a guarantee. Fear of incidental benefits to some members of adesignated group should not prevent the delivery of vital aid to a large population in need. \u00a0\u00a0For instance, if lives are saved because a U.S. nonprofit digs a well for a Somali village, the fact that one al- Shabaab member gets a drink of water should not deny this critical resource to the entire village.\u00a0To do otherwise is to impose collective punishment on the victims, a clear violation of\u00a0human rights standards<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/a>The Crisis in Somalia<\/strong><\/h4><\/span>
<\/a>The Legal Dilemma<\/strong><\/h4><\/span>